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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- APPENDIX

citizens be liberal; it is not enough that the representative of conservative-voting citizens be conservative.

While the great Edmund Burke was in a race to be elected from Bristol to the House of Commons, he said, in effect, to the voters: "My opponent promises that if elected he will vote according to your will, as you choose. I can only promise to inform myself on issues and to vote as an informed conscience directs." A thoroughly informed conscience is a rarity.

I have known RALPH YARBOROUGH as friend and man for many years. He is perhaps the best read man that Texas has ever sent to Washington. His cultivated and disciplined mind is always seeking information on subjects that Government must act upon. Like other individuals, he travels in a certain direction, but his mind is not closed to facts and conditions warranting a change of mind. The power of intellect to weigh knowledge and to judge justly is his.

We are all for gain. I myself should not always promise and vote as Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH has promised and voted, but mark this: The only gain he has ever sought, consistently or inconsistently, has been public gain. He does not try to milk the public for private profit. He seeks the good of people. Nor is his consideration of humanity provincial minded.

Every man and every woman is judged by his or her sense of values. Whenever the majority of others in any democracy have a high sense of values that country will have become a Utopia. When values of life—values beyond money, values that express civilization, enlightenment, and justice for the human race come up, we can count on Senator RALPH YARBOROUGH to stand for those values.

I salute him for his sense of civilized values, for his sense of justice, for his enlightened intellect, for his decency as a human being, and for his integrity.

The Turn in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following editorial from the November 4, 1963, edition of the Wall Street Journal:

THE TURN IN VIETNAM

Whether the forcible overthrow of the Diem regime bodes good or ill no man can now say. What it does do is leave a lot of important questions unanswered about southeast Asia and U.S. foreign policy in general.

At the moment, Washington seems pleased at the turn of events. Despite the apparent assassinations of President Diem and his brother. And it is at least moderately encouraging that the military leaders in South Vietnam are pledged to turn the Government over to civilians under more democratic auspices than prevailed under Diem, and to prosecute the war against the Communists more forcefully.

But let no one, including Washington, forget that this is a military coup, in defiance of a solemn constitution, the very thing which Washington bitterly deplores when it occurs in Latin America. Moreover, the U.S. Government was heavily involved in it, whether it engineered the overthrow

or not. At a minimum, the U.S. Government used its pressures to encourage an uprising.

We do not say this is necessarily avoidable. South Vietnam would long since have fallen to the Communists were it not for the deep U.S. commitment of troops and money. If that is the kind of thing we must do, then it only stands to reason that we must use our force not only against the Communists but to insure, as best we can, that political chaos does not sabotage that effort. Indeed, one of the more hopeful prospects is that perhaps now we and Vietnam can get on with the main business.

What is less edifying is the draft which we have permitted for years in southeast Asia. We gave up in Laos, which is understandable in the circumstances, but the U.S. Government didn't have to try to fool the people by calling it a sound settlement.

In Vietnam the United States couldn't seem to figure out what it was doing. It is at least conceivable that a more adept diplomacy, plus the same kinds of pressures used in the present instance, could have softened the Vietnamese political troubles and hence averted the coup. In retrospect it appears as though our Government had never heard of Buddhists until they started rioting last May.

That is the dismaying thing, not only about Vietnam but almost every other foreign policy matter. The Government seems to be constantly taken by surprise by events, even when it may have been partly instrumental in bringing them about.

The State Department can't seem to understand De Gaulle until he starts acting as many predicted he would. The United States constantly confuses Europe with policy switches and the only conclusion is that the U.S. Government itself is confused, even with all its resources of money, intelligence gathering and political leverage.

We profoundly hope the Vietnam coup will turn out to be a victory for the Vietnamese people and the struggle against communism. It is difficult to see it as a manifestation of a farsighted American foreign policy.

Stockpile Ruckus

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS

OF DELAWARE

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Record an editorial entitled "Stockpile Ruckus," which was published yesterday in the Washington Daily News.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STOCKPILE RUCKUS

After more than 20 months of noisy complaints, a Senate subcommittee has produced a bill theoretically designed to make some sense of the Government's enormous stockpile program.

This program was begun after World War II in an avowed effort to assure that in event of a new war the country would be supplied with critical materials—instead of having to scrounge desperately for its war needs after hostilities had begun.

The idea was sound, but like so many good ideas it ran into excesses. Senator STUART SYMINGTON, who headed the investigation sparked by President Kennedy, emphasizes

charges of what the President called unconscionable profits. But the President also complained that the stockpile had an excess supply, worth \$3.4 billion, which he said "astonished" him.

The latest report of Congress Joint Committee on Nonessential Expenditures covers the stockpile program for last June. It shows that in this month the overall stocks were slightly reduced.

But in the same month, according to the Joint Committee, the Government bought more aluminum, bauxite, bismuth, chromium, industrial diamonds, fluorospar, graphite, lead, mica, tantalum, thorium, tungsten, and zinc—although all of these materials already were in excess.

If the stockpile excesses were as astonishing as the President and Senator SYMINGTON have been saying, how is it this situation is being corrected by making it worse? What goes on here?

Some Pertinent Questions on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, many questions remain unanswered on the events of recent days in Vietnam.

Although press accounts are now supplying us with more information on the coup which ousted the Diem regime and subsequent takeover by the military junta, the extent of U.S. involvement has not yet been clarified by the State Department and other interested Federal agencies.

On Monday I asked some questions on the Vietnam situation in a speech on the floor of the House. Today I wish to suggest additional questions which require answers.

Was the advisability of a coup against Diem and the U.S. role in such a development the subject of high-level discussions subsequent to the August 20 date on Buddhist pagodas?

When the decision was made to curtail U.S. economic and military assistance to the Diem regime, was consideration given to the effect such action might have in encouraging the military to perpetrate a coup?

How can our policies toward the military junta in South Vietnam be spared with our policies toward ruling juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras?

Is it not the policy of the United States to extend asylum to save those whose lives are in danger. Why was Ngo Dinh Can surrendered to the military after the Diem-Nhu experience?

Did Ambassador Lodge go to Vietnam with any instructions which might have made him sympathetic to a coup attempt?

What effect will these developments in Vietnam and U.S. involvement in the coup have on our allies in SEATO, in Europe, and most particularly in Central and South America?

Is there any evidence that the CIA and the DDC might have been working at cross purposes, with one of the agencies